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Citizens in the middle class:  





Historically, research on urban socio-economic trends, processes and policies in Africa, and 
the global South more broadly, has focused on urban spaces and citizens that represent the 
extremes of wealth. This is demonstrated by bodies of literature addressing informal 
housing/slums for the poor on the one hand, juxtaposed against research on high-income elite 
forms of often privatised and secure forms of housing on the other (e.g. Lemanski and 
Oldfield, 2009). Recently there has been growing interest in the emerging indigenous middle-
class in the global South (e.g. Bannerjee and Duflo, 2008; Lange and Meier, 2009; Ravallion, 
2009), initially in India (e.g. Fernandes, 2006; Nijman, 2006), with more recent interest in 
Africa (e.g. Ncumbe, 2013), and particularly South Africa (e.g. Visagie and Posel, 2013; 
Southall, 2014; Khunou, 2015; McEwan et al, 2015), providing a new focus for global South 
scholarship that has traditionally been polarised between the elite and the poor. The 
emergence of a 'middle' group is relatively new in sub-Saharan Africa, a continent 
historically polarised between the affluent and the poor. However, debates surrounding how 
to define and measure Africa's middle-classes; specifically, whether to adopt a broad 
classification that includes the 'not so poor' (e.g. ADB 2011, Visagie 2013) or restrict the 
middle-class label to those with financial security and social mobility (e.g. Thurlow et al, 
2015); highlight the limitations of using the middle-class label as a means to overcome the 
historic binary focus on elite versus poor within African cities. Furthermore, using a global 
class-based label carries normative expectations around lifestyle, education and income that 
are not easily transferred between countries and cultures. In contrast, this paper refers to 
'middling', 'middle' or 'in the middle' citizens to reflect a status which is not exclusively about 
class or income per se, but refers to citizens who are neither affluent nor poor. While prior 
work has explored the governance strategies of "missing middle" citizens in urban India 
(Lemanski and Tawa Lama-Rewal, 2013), this research demonstrates how the needs of this 
middle group are easily misrepresented by policy interventions, caught in the interstitial 
spaces between social and economic interventions, and public and private institutions.  
 
In South Africa there is a demographic group widely recognised as 'middle' in terms of their 
housing positionality, collectively classified in public discourse as 'gap' households, based on 
both income and inability to access homeownership either via state-supported or private 
sector mechanisms. Despite minimal scholarly discussion of the needs and attributes of this 
'middle' demographic, it is estimated that approximately one-quarter of South African 
households are in the 'gap' category (Rust 2012b). Consequently, the empirical starting point 
of this research is an analysis of gap housing policies and practices in South Africa. These 
policies and practices target households who function in between South Africa's dual-housing 
markets, financially ineligible for either state-subsidised or banking-financed property 
ownership. Such citizens are not necessarily middle-income in the sense of being in the 
middle quintile of national income distribution, or middle-class in terms of occupation, 
education or self-identity, but they are politically positioned as 'middle' in policy terms, based 
on inability to access either public or private housing finance. This paper therefore uses 
housing policy as a lens through which to identify and explore the positionality and policy 
consequences of being a 'middle' citizen, neither affluent nor poor. Housing in South Africa 
provides a particularly pertinent lens through which to explore the notion of a 'middle' 
demographic because the post-apartheid state has prioritised housing as the primary means to 
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overcome past inequalities (Marais and Cloete, 2015). More broadly, homeownership has 
been promoted round the globe as the means to tackle poverty and ensure capitalist asset 
accumulation for all income groups (based on neoliberal agendas, and most recently 
influenced by the pro-titling arguments of Hernando de Soto, 2000).
1
 While this paper uses 
housing as the means to illuminate the posititionality of 'middle' households, arguably other 
sectors (e.g. education, health) would demonstrate both similar and different policy gaps. 
This paper employs the pre-existing context-specific term 'gap' in describing households 
caught in between policy provision (in this case between public and private institutions and 
interventions), whereas 'middle' refers to the broader demographic identity of those neither 
affluent nor poor. Arguably the very notion of a policy 'gap' group assumes a state welfare 
programme for the poor (i.e. where gap households are unable to access either state or private 
provision), and as the provision of a welfare state differs significantly according to sector and 
country, the 'gap' terminology may not hold traction in other empirical contexts. However, 
the problem of gaps in terms of policy provision for accessing homeownership is not unique 
to South Africa or the global South, with many Western Europe states implementing a range 
of policies to support middle-income groups to become homeowners (Hoekstra and Marais 
forthcoming). While each context uses empirically-specific language, such as 'gap' in South 
Africa, shared ownership schemes for 'key workers' in the UK, VPO housing in Spain, or 
'koopgarant' in the Netherlands (ibid), the broader terminology of the 'middle' can be 
employed universally. Indeed, extending beyond housing, the concept of "being in the 
middle" is employed by Jeffrey (2010:97) in relation to men in India unable to transition from 
youth to adulthood, while Kihato (2013) refers to the "in between geographies" of African 
migrant women in Johannesburg who are caught between their past home and imagined 
future. 
 
This paper is structured by first situating the research within broader debates on the emerging 
middle-class in the global South (as well as Africa and South Africa) and justifying use of the 
phrase 'middle' rather than 'middle-class' or 'middle-income'. The empirical context is 
subsequently explained, outlining South Africa’s gap housing context as well as the specific 
methods used to research this paper. The paper then investigates the ways in which gap 
housing policies and practices are understood and experienced by both housing providers 
(e.g. the state, developers, bankers) and users (i.e. gap households). Analysis reveals the 
conceptual and practical limitations of using multiple actors (public and private) with 
divergent aims and agendas (economic and social) to stimulate (largely financial) support that 
aims to detach gap households from state reliance to secure homeownership. More 
specifically, the example of gap housing policy illuminates the ways in which ‘middle’ 
households fall into a policy and practice void, caught between rich and poor, public and 
private, economic and social identities, actors and agendas. The paper concludes by 
promoting use of the term 'middle' to better understand the needs of a large proportion of the 
urban demographic who are neither affluent nor poor.  
 
 
In the middle: middle-class, middle-income or policy-middle? 
 
The creation of a middle-class identity has its conceptual roots in classical Marxist analysis 
juxtaposing the proletariat against the bourgeoise (the worker and the capital-owning elite, 
respectively) where class is embedded in the social division of labour and the means of 
                                                            
1 While this obsession with homeownership has been critiqued, particularly by Alan Gilbert (2008), it remains 
dominant in global policy. 
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capitalist production (Wright Mills, 1951). While Max Weber extended Marxist class identity 
to include not just material assets, but also skills and education (Thurlow et al 2015), the 
post-industrial context challenged this two-tier labour-based class analysis leading some 
scholars to argue that class is fragmenting and declining in importance (Clark and Lipset 
1991), while others argue that class remains pivotal to social understanding, but has stratified 
into multiple tiers (Hout et al 1993). Nonetheless, popular and scholar understandings of 
global society have continued to promote the middle-classes as a dominant feature of 
contemporary society, expanding in size and diversity alongside the apparent decline of the 
working-classes in the post-industrial era, demonstrated by the emergence of the so-called 
'new' middle classes (Lees, 2014; McEwan et al, 2015). While precise definitions of the 
middle-class vary across time and space, with no universally agreed criteria, the two key 
indicators are financial (e.g. income and assets) and status, emphasising the role of education 
and occupation (Hauser and Warren, 1997; Atkinson and Brandolini, 2011). In this context, 
the upper-middle-classes are highly-educated professionals near the top of income 
stratifications, and the lower-middle-classes are semi-professionals, skilled artisans and lower 
management with more modest but still secure incomes that place them well outside poverty 
(Gilbert, 1998). In the global North popular and scholarly analysis has largely emphasised 
status rather than income as the primary determinant of class (recognising, for example, that a 
dual-income working-class household could potentially have a higher income than a single-
income middle-class household, Gilbert, 1998), but this is partially mitigated by recognition 
that the two criteria of income and status inter-connect and overlap to such an extent that they 
reveal roughly the same population group. However, in the global South the inverse is found, 
where widespread reliance on static income-based class measures (albeit with some notable 
exceptions, e.g. Spronk 2012) are increasingly critiqued for ignoring status (e.g. Corral et al, 
2015). 
 
Contemporary academic and popular interest in the indigenous middle-class in the global 
South is framed around expectations that this demographic group have the potential to 
accelerate economic, social, cultural and political progress in their countries (e.g. Easterly, 
2001; Bannerjee and Duflo, 2008; Amoranto et al, 2010; Birdsall, 2010; ADB 2011). While 
definitions differ according to author and context, the global South middle-class are broadly 
defined by the ILO as households with a $4-13 daily per capita consumption, and it is 
estimated that 41.6% of workers in the global South are middle-class, a demographic 
category that has doubled in size since 1991 and is continuing to grow (Kapos and 
Bourmpoula, 2013). This ILO definition focuses on those who are a little wealthier that the 
“working poor” (under $2 per day) and “near poor” ($2-4 per day), and ignores status-based 
measures (Kapos and Bourmpoula, 2013). Focusing on sub-Saharan Africa, the emerging 
middle-class are frequently heralded in the media as the potential saviour of the continent’s 
ills, expected to boost economic growth and democratic expansion (e.g. ABD, 2011; Ncube, 
2013; Southall, 2014). However, much like the ILO definitions, the broadness of African 
middle-class definitions limits the likelihood of meeting these expectations. The African 
Development Bank's (2011) African middle-class criteria are widely used, and address those 
with per capita consumptions of $2-20pd, a group argued to have risen in size from 80 
million in 1990 to 120 million in 2010 (Thurlow et al, 2015). This is a vast income range that 
despite comprising one-third of Africa’s population, is dominated by those barely (and 
potentially temporarily) out of poverty. Given that 60% of the ADB's African middle-class 
consume $2-4 per day, and that this “floating class” (ADB, 2011) are reliant on irregular 
and/or informal labour (Banerjee and Duflo, 2008), it is unsurprisingly that the ADB's 
middle-class criteria have been highly criticised as a "stretch concept" (Mkandawire, CNN, 
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2011) that propels those literally just outside poverty into the lofty heights of the middle 
classes from whom so much is expected (McEwan et al, 2015; Lentz, 2016).  
 
The majority of African middle-class scholarship focuses on South Africa, with heated debate 
on how to measure and define this group, alongside analysis exploring the economic and 
political potential of the black middle-class in the post-apartheid context (e.g. Burger et al 
2004; Rivero et al 2003; Southall 2004, 2014; Visagie and Posel, 2013; Khunou, 2015; 
McEwan et al, 2015). As part of these ongoing debates, Posel and Visagie (2013) define 
South Africa's middle-class by employing two separate measures: income (50-150% of 
median national income) and status (professional occupations), revealing that these indicators 
relate to two completely separate population groups (also Visagie, 2013, 2015). While this 
finding is hardly surprising given the likelihood that a median-based income measurement 
will include the poor when used in a country with widespread poverty, (instead, the income-
based indicator could more usefully have employed a minimum threshold that is well-above 
poverty levels), their analysis confirms the absurdity of attempts to define the African 
middle-class according to static income measurements. Posel and Visagie's (2013) analysis 
describes South Africa's median middle-income households, comprising nearly one-third of 
the population (31.6%), as largely poor and Black African, with household incomes of 
ZAR1520-4560 pcm (approx. $4-12pd),
2
 derived from labour-wages, government grants and 
remittances. In contrast, the occupation status criteria (ie. professionals) defines roughly one-
fifth of the population (20.4%) as 'middle-class', and points to a Black African and White 
elite with household incomes of ZAR5600-40000 (approx. $15-110pd), derived from labour-
wages and investments (Ibid). The statistics analysed in the research indicate little overlap 
between these two demographic groups, and while Posel and Visagie (2013) argue that the 
diversity of interpretation across the two definitions enables a broad interpretation of middle-
class identity, I disagree, arguing instead that such divergence highlights the limitations of 
using a 'middle-class' label rooted in Marxist and Weberian frameworks in the global South 
context of extreme poverty and inequality. This is particularly acute in South Africa, where 
the legacies of apartheid ensure severe socio-economic inequality and spatial separation. 
While those in the 'occupation' group comprise an extremely broad and heterogenous group 
that include those arguably middle- (and upper-) class in terms of Marxist or Weberian 
indicators of relative income and status, the 'median-income' group are not middle-class in 
either income or status, and use of the middle-class label in reference to this group is 
aspirational at best and misleading at worst. Furthermore, in South Africa where income 
inequality is extreme and the elite receive a disproportionate share of income (Seekings and 
Nattrass, 2005; Leibbrandt et al, 2012), there are two potential policy outcomes from 
promoting a very broad definition of middle-class identity. Firstly, the potential misuse of the 
'middle-class' tag to target policy at the affluent elite as a (misdirected) means to tackle 
inequality, potentially at the expense of the less-affluent (Visagie, 2015), e.g. Black 
Economic Empowerment (Posel, 2010); and secondly, the potential that widespread 
expectations of the middle-classes bringing social, economic, cultural and political 
transformation could be placed on those in the 'middle-income', which in a country with high 
levels of poverty will include the poor. 
 
The dominant scholarly critique of the ILO and ADB definitions is that the demographic 
group described as middle-class by their static financial indicators (income and consumption) 
does not match normative expectations of middle-class identity and status (Lentz, 2016). 
                                                            
2 All exchange rates are from www.xe.com – June 2015. However, direct translation to the ADB criteria is 
limited as Posel and Visagie focus on households rather than individuals. 
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While normative understandings of the middle-classes are no longer framed around a 
traditional nuclear home-owning suburban family supported by a male bread-winner and a 
female home-maker (as critiqued in popular culture by films such as American Beauty and 
The Stepford Wives), middle-class identity is widely perceived as restricted to households 
with certain broad characteristics (e.g. financial security, a comfortable standard of living and 
the means (financial and education) to function independently within society). Consequently, 
when the ILO and the ADB employ the label of middle-class in reference to the 'not-so-poor' 
they are criticised for inaccuracy (Birdsall, 2010). Arguably, some of this 'inclusive' middle-
class labelling is associated with policymakers’ interests in using the ILO and ADB data to 
argue that households are moving out of poverty (Ballard, 2012). However, use of a class-
based category that comes pre-loaded with normative expectations and assumptions about 
identity and transformative utility that are extended to those at risk of falling into poverty is 
arguably problematic in promoting unachievable policy outcomes. While there is ongoing 
questioning of the broadness and assumed homogeneity of this African middle-class category 
within scholarly debates, finance-led measures such as those from the ILO and ADB remain 
dominant within policy debates and popular media. Below I discuss three alternative 
measures for defining the middle-class in Africa that combine financial and non-financial 
indicators in order to demonstrate these ongoing scholarly definitional debates, and the 
positioning of this research on 'middle' citizens, within these debates.  
 
Thurlow et al's approach (2015) proposes retaining class-based groupings, defining the 
African middle class as possessing economic security and the potential for social mobility 
based on three key indicators (none of which are income or consumption): completion of 
secondary schooling, access to basic housing services (piped water, flush toilet, electricity) 
and being employed in a skilled occupation. While Thurlow et al's definition is less 
dominated by static financial measures that the ADB/ILO criteria, it is still framed by a 
normative assumption of affluence-based class (e.g. access to services) and ultimately points 
to a high-income (in domestic relative terms) demographic group. More radically, Shimeles 
and Ncube (2014) use Sen's theory of capabilities to shift away from class-based labels, 
instead differentiating between the empowered (who can access material assets and services) 
and the disempowered. While this research endorses Shimeles and Ncube's (2014) avoidance 
of class-based labels, their reliance on a binary analysis overlooks those who meet neither 
classification, and is still framed by access to assets and services that require money. Lentz 
(2016) proposes using class as a behavioural descriptive, rather than the label for a pre-
determined group, so that households can be understood as "doing being middle class" (at 
this specific time and place) without a deterministic identity category. While this research 
recognises that many households 'in the middle' are indeed "doing being middle class" (Lentz 
2016:42) in terms of their consumption-based behaviour and aspirations, using class-based 
language can imply that 'middle' households are financially and socially secure, potentially 
overlooking their marginalised position in policy and practice. Indeed, Lentz's (2016) detailed 
overview of the literature on the global South and African middle-class identity leads her to 
argue that scholars within this field urgently need to undertake detailed empirical research on 
the middle-classes in Africa in order to "go beyond folk terminology, develop their own 
analytical categories, and critically engage with the baggage that received theoretical 
concepts bring with them" (Lentz 2016:19). Within this context, this research promotes the 
concept of a 'middle' identity that is divorced from class-based analysis in order to illuminate 
social and economic processes that are distorted by debates around defining class categories.  
 
 




Housing policy and practice in South Africa has overwhelmingly focused on the extremes of 
the market, prioritising the needs of the very poor alongside the demands of the elite. At one 
extreme, South Africa has implemented an extensive programme of house-building for low-
income household ownership (e.g. Tomlinson, 1999, 2005; Huchzermeyer, 2001, 2003; 
Baumann, 2003; Gilbert, 2004; Lemanski 2008, 2011). Concurrently, there has been 
significant attention directed at privatised forms of housing for elite households in South 
Africa, such as gated communities and neighbourhood enclosures (e.g. Hook and Vrdoljak, 
2002; Landman, 2004, 2006; Lemanski, 2004, 2006; Lemanski et al., 2008; Ballard and 
Jones, 2011). However, what has received far less attention (with the notable exception of 
Rust 2006, 2009, 2012a, 2012b; Cirolia forthcoming; Hoekstra and Marais forthcoming) are 
the housing needs of 'gap' households, eligible for neither the state housing programme nor 
able to access private housing finance. 
 
Since the demise of apartheid, the South African government has prioritized housing 
provision as part of its anti-poverty agenda, promoting homeownership as integral to "the 
process of restorative justice" (Marais and Cloete, 2015:261). The three key strategies 
employed by the state to extend homeownership to previously excluded black South 
Africans
3
 are the capital subsidy scheme for the poor, new housing finance models to extend 
credit to those previously excluded, and the transfer of ownership of public rental housing to 
tenants through the Discount Benefit Scheme. The National Housing Subsidy Scheme 
effectively provides low-income households (monthly income below ZAR3500 (approx. $9 
per day)) with ownership of a brick-built house with electricity, sewerage and running water. 
Notwithstanding criticisms of the policy’s limitations in terms of its exclusive focus on 
homeownership, the poor quality of construction, small houses, delays in receiving title deeds 
and the creation of ‘slum’-like communities on the urban periphery; the scale of construction 
has been rapid, with approximately three million
4
 subsidy houses (known colloquially as 
‘RDP houses’)5 built since 1994. While some criticisms were addressed through the 2004 
‘Breaking New Ground’ focus on producing higher quality and larger houses (40m2 rather 
than 20-34 m
2
) within better-integrated communities (in terms of proximity to services and 
economic opportunities), this has slowed housing delivery. Since 2014 the focus has shifted 
again, to the production of mega human settlements on the urban periphery, as a rapid 
measure to clear housing backlogs and meet the shelter needs for South Africa's urbanising 
population. At the same time, South Africa’s formal housing market has boomed, with house 
prices rising by an average of 20% per year from 2000 to 2007 (with a major 2008-2009 dip 
in property prices and number of sales following the 2008 global financial crisis and the 2009 
recession), stabilising at just under 10% per year since 2013 (Absa House Price Indices, 
2014). Between these two trends, a housing affordability gap has emerged and expanded, 
representing those on the "edges" of accessing homeownership via either public or private 
measures (Marais and Cloete 2015).  
 
                                                            
3 Although technically white South Africans are also eligible for these housing schemes, in reality, few would 
meet the financial criteria. 
4 There are conflicting figures for the number of subsidy houses constructed, and three million represents a 
broad compromise between these figures. At one extreme, South Africa's Minister for Human Settlement claims 
that 4.3 million houses and subsidies have been provided since 1994 (Sisulu 2016). However, a report by 
Shisaka (2011) concluded that while 3.85 million beneficiaries had been approved for a housing subsidy 
between 1994 and 2011, only 2 million received a registered property (it is unknown how many of the 1.85 
million remaining beneficiaries received an unregistered property or no property).  
5 After the 1994 Reconstruction and Development Plan 
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In South Africa, the gap market is understood as comprising those who are financially 
excluded from homeownerhip due to the combined consequences of ineligibility for a 
government housing subsidy (e.g. due to earning above the income threshold) accompanied 
by inability to secure private bank finance (e.g. due to earning an insufficiently high and/or 
secure income). There is general agreement that this applies to households earning ZAR3501-
15000 pcm (approx $10-40pd).
6
 Precise income-based definitions are problematic, due not 
only to the movable nature of household income, but also fluctuations in the income required 
to buy private housing (depending on for example interest rates, bond deals, construction 
costs and land availability), and indeed these income boundaries are policy constructs in any 
case. Notwithstanding these limitations, it is estimated that approximately 25% of South 
Africa’s population fall into this gap bracket (Rust, 2012b),7 estimated to comprise 2.7 
million urban households (Cirolia, forthcoming), ranging from key public and private sector 
workers such as teachers, government employees, nurses and police officers, to manual 
workers such as maids, drivers and factory workers. Over the past decade, the South African 
state has provided various financial incentives designed to pressure the private sector, 
particularly banks and developers, to provide loans and construct houses targeting the gap 
market (Marais and Cloete 2015). Essentially, the state has promoted a private-sector-driven 
approach, with the onus on banks and developers to finance housing projects (with minimal 
state support), and for the private sector to engage directly with gap households. This has had 
limited success, and on the whole, inadequate housing finance for the non-affluent, alongside 
an absence of well-located serviced land for non-high-income housing development, has 
resulted in a shortage of housing units for gap households (Gunter and Manuel 2016). In 
effect, the state's goal is to facilitate the creation of and/or provide support for a tier of private 
property owners independent from the state for their basic welfare needs (as opposed to the 
reliance of state-subsidy housing recipients on the state). The widespread provision of state-
subsidised housing for the very poor has not driven local economic growth in South Africa in 
the same way that social housing in other countries has had a stimulating effect (Gunter and 
Manuel 2016),
8
 and consequently there is a clear desire for the state to limit the proportion of 
society heavily reliant on its services to meet their basic needs. The state's conceptualisation 
of gap housing policy is explicitly about expanding South Africa's bank-financed (rather than 
state-subsidised) home-owning class, and there is an implicit assumption that banks should 
support this as part of their redemption for redlining former black townships (Marais and 
Cloete 2015). Although issues of class are not explicitly discussed within the gap housing 
agenda, the state's ideal of private-sector-driven homeownership implicitly promotes a 
normative middle-class narrative of nuclear family financial independence. Indeed, the South 
African state has been strongly influenced by the neoliberal preoccupation with widening 
homeownership as a means to overcome poverty, a perspective that has significant traction 
around the world, from British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's call for "a nation of 
homeowners" to Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto's belief that title deeds are a magic 
bullet for social and economic transformation. These views remain dominant despite 
                                                            
6 There is some variation of definition within this income bracket. For example, Rust (2009) argues that the real 
gap is those earning R3501-9000 per month because there are so few policies/houses that benefit this group; 
while First National Bank’s “Housing Finance” division (as opposed to their mainstream “Homeloans” 
department) targets those earning ZAR3501-25000. However, as the Finance Linked Individual Subsidy 
Programme (the most recent gap strategy) targets ZAR3501-15000 this paper employs that broad category 
(whilst recognising the limitations of using static income measures). 
7 Based on census 2011 data, approximately 60% of South African households are eligible for subsidy housing, 
and approximately 15% are able to secure a private mortgage (Statistics SA, 2012). 
8 This is due partly to the peripheral location of most settlements, with poor access to amenities inhibiting local 
economic stimulation, but also due to the conceptualisation of housing in South Africa as primarily about shelter 
and asset accumulation rather than as a contributor to local economic development (Gunter and Manuel 2016). 
8 
 
evidence that homeownership can actually increase marginalisation by acting as a financial 
burden (e.g. creating expectations that homeowners must furnish and maintain 'proper' 
standards of living as well as pay higher living costs) and by providing an asset that does not 
enable upwards property movement (e.g. Ross 2010; Lemanski 2011). Although the South 
African state is promoting homeownership for all income groups, the gap housing agenda is 
explicitly about creating a new tier of homeowners via private financing rather than state 
subsidies, as highlighted below.  
 
Despite growing public awareness and state discussion of the concept of the gap market, until 
recently there had been minimal deliverables. President Zuma used his 2012 and 2013 State 
of the Nation Addresses to launch two new initiatives designed to stimulate private finance to 
support gap households to enter the existing housing property market (rather than to extend 
the housing market to meet their needs). Firstly, a ZAR1 billion guarantee fund, managed by 
the National Housing Finance Corporation (NHFC) facilitating private bank loans to those 
with household incomes in the gap range. Secondly, the re-launch of the FLISP initiative 
(Finance Linked Individual Subsidy programme),
9
 also managed by the NHFC, enabling gap 
households to access banking finance by offering a subsidy that effectively provides a loan 
deposit. FLISP provides a one-off subsidy, on a sliding scale of between ZAR20,000-87,000 
($1640-7100) to South African households with monthly incomes in the ZAR3,501-15,000 
bracket (households with higher incomes receive less subsidy) who have not previously 
owned property, to support a bank loan for the purchase of a property (initially the property 
cost was capped at ZAR300,000 ($25,000)), serviced site, or as a contribution to self-build. 
Initially FLISP, much like previous gap-related incentives, was restricted to developer-
approved new-build projects (albeit now requiring eligible households, rather than 
developers, to apply for the subsidy), but was expanded in 2013, allowing households to 
apply for a FLISP subsidy to support a banking finance application for the purchase of a re-
sale house on the open market. This represents a significant change in approach to the gap 
housing market, not only potentially opening the wider housing market to those in this 
income bracket (rather than restricting them to a handful of specific developments) but also 
encouraging an increased private individual/household-led (rather than developer-led) 
approach to securing housing and finance. However, this research reveals that in assuming 
gap households fit private banking models of finance (i.e. nuclear families with 1-2 incomes 
sufficient to support a housing loan over the long-term), the policy fails to recognise the 
insecure but multiple incomes and weak affordability amongst gap households. Furthermore, 
the focus on promoting gap households into the property market starts from the failed 
assumption that the problem rests with household deficiency rather than housing market 
failure. Consequently, gap housing policies focus on enabling gap/middle households to 
engage with the existing housing market without state support (i.e. as private households 
receiving finance from private lenders) rather than considering ways to extend a housing 
market that currently excludes roughly a quarter of the population from homeownership. 
Using the example of gap housing then, this paper argues that middle households in the 
global South fall between the extremes of traditional policy interventions and practices (in 





                                                            
9 Although FLSIP originated in 2007, the subsidy at that time was ZAR40 000 and only accessible to developers 
for new builds, and was largely ineffective due to these two constraints. FLISP was therefore re-launched with a 
larger loan amounts in 2012 and opened to households (rather than just private developers) in 2013..  
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In researching this paper the key stakeholders involved in gap housing planning and delivery 
were interviewed, including state officials, policy researchers, private developers and banking 
finance representatives. A total of 65 interviews were conducted across several years (2009-
2014) and consequently cover a range of gap housing policy and practices across municipal 
South Africa (pre- and post-FLISP). In-depth qualitative fieldwork was undertaken in 2009 in 
three developer-led housing projects that targeted the gap income bracket (prior to FLISP), 
comprising semi-structured interviews with 22 residents, one community leader, two local 
councillors, two site managers and two developers. The three settlements are all situated in 
Cape Town (Highlands Village, Royal Maitland, and Aliwal Gardens, see Figure One), where 
self-reported household incomes are broadly ZAR7500-15000pcm (approx $20-40pd) 
comprising for example skilled labourers, office workers, bank tellers, factory supervisors 
and government employees.  
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
Policy mis-targeting: caught in the middle 
 
Given the large number (absolute and relative) of households with incomes in the gap 
bracket, alongside the overwhelming interest developers receive in response to gap housing 
projects, and the shortage of available gap housing, indications that gap housing policy is 
failing to reach its target market are of great concern. For example, while a blog post by 
housing expert Kecia Rust (2012a) explaining how the new FLISP subsidy might work 
received many hundreds of comments asking questions about eligibility, take-up of the 
FLISP has been exceptionally low. According to a senior banking representative fewer than 
100 FLISP subsidies were released by their bank in 2013, and given that only three banks are 
approved for FLISP this indicates extremely low take-up (Senior banking official1). At the 
same time, the City of Cape Town reserved ZAR7 million for FLISP subsidies in 2012-2013, 
for which they received no applications (City housing official2). And while take-up has 
increased, with 1969 FLISP approvals from 2012 to October 2014, this is still a tiny 
proportion of the alleged 2.7 million urban households in this income bracket (Cirolia, 
forthcoming). 
 
This section reveals two explanations for the low take-up of gap housing policies, both linked 
to the faulty expectations of the state, firstly in terms of affordability for gap households, and 
secondly, in terms of the housing market itself. While the state has an idealised vision of gap 
households as needing a small amount of financial support in order to secure privately-
financed homeownership, the research presented here reveals that the bulk of gap households 
are unable to secure banking finance (e.g. due to irregular and/or low incomes alongside 
existing credit agreements), and that suitable housing is not available or affordable (to 
construct) in any case. Consequently, gap housing policies mis-target on two fronts: 
households are insufficiently financially secure to access private finance, and suitable 
housing is unavailable. 
 
Household affordability 
Due to South Africa's history of non-payment as a strategy for protest (e.g. apartheid-era 
township boycotts of rents and service charges, and the 1980s-90s mortgage defaults 
following mining job losses and interest rate rises) banks have historically been reluctant to 
provide loans to lower-income households (Pillay and Naudé 2006, Hoekstra and Marais 
forthcoming), and despite government incentives banks remain attached to traditional 
affordability requirements that ultimately exclude the majority of South Africans. The result 
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is that few households with incomes in the gap range can access housing finance (Cirolia, 
forthcoming). While FLISP is intended to provide the necessary deposit for gap households, 
in reality most gap households' existing financial commitments exclude them from bank 
affordability criteria (CAHF 2015). Specifically, gap households are over-burdened by 
multiple microloans coupled with subsequently poor credit ratings.  
 
The biggest thing is credit that’s been extended – like microloans. It’s scary. I am 
looking at a complaint where we denied a bond because of affordability – this guy 
was paying ZAR3,000 per month on a micro-loan, so even with an income of 
ZAR12,000 we denied the loan. He wants a house but he cannot afford. It’s so 




We had a list of people who are interested in housing and earn ZAR3,500 upwards. 
We got it [the list] from the city …Now we look at who can afford to pay and then the 
list collapses. These people earn enough [to qualify] but they have been overwhelmed 
with microloans from various shops and businesses. So they don’t actually have 
enough disposable income to pay for housing, and their credit records have been 
ruined, so the banks won’t touch them. And that’s the rule, not the exception. Out of 
10 interested people, 7 or 8 fall in that bracket. [D.W., private developer] 
 
We gave a list of names to the gap developers, of the people in that area who earn 
over ZAR3,500. So we gave them 200 names, but only four qualified in terms of the 
banks' criteria [City housing official1] 
 
The extent of indebtedness amongst South Africa's middle demographic is a huge (and 
largely unrecognised) problem, where consumption practices amongst previously 
disadvantaged groups have been facilitated by poor regulation in the finance industry around 
access to credit (James, 2014). James' (2014) in-depth study reveals how the most heavily 
indebted households (in relative terms) are not the poorest or the wealthiest segments of 
South African society, but those with a wage roughly in the middle, such as nurses, teachers, 
police officers and council officials, with sufficient salary to secure credit, but who face 
pressure from their families to borrow amounts that exceed their ability to repay. Those with 
secure salaries are expected to provide for their (often extended) families in very visible ways 
in order to demonstrate an aspirational status of material consumption. However, while 
Thurlow et al (2015) reveal the ways in which African middle households start spending 'like 
the middle class' in consumerist terms, even when they lack basic amenities, James (2014) 
cautions against assumptions that this materialist consumption is framed around luxury 
consumables, instead revealing how loans are used to access higher education as well as 
perform key rites of passages (e.g. weddings, bride price, funerals) that visually demonstrate 
aspirational markers of affluence. Taken in the context of housing, there is a clear mismatch 
between the income-based criterion of gap housing policy and banks' affordability-based 
criteria. Essentially this is the natural outcome of a policy designed to promote gap 
households into reliance on the private sector, but where households targeted in fact require 
additional support (e.g. education programmes on budgeting) in order to bridge the gap from 
state-supported to private-financed housing policies and practices, as well as better state 
regulation of the credit industry (formal and informal), and reform of housing finance 
models. The banking model for determining access to finance is based on western-centric 
                                                            
10 A pseudonym-based code for interviewees, alongside the date of the interview, are provided to preserve the 
anonymity of respondents. 
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norms that assume a nuclear family, and consequently assess 1-2 incomes per household. 
However, many low-income (gap and non-gap) households include extended family members 
who contribute financially to the household but whose incomes are ignored by finance 
models. Indeed, a senior banking official commented that one reason that their gap finance 
loans are less risky than traditional home loans is because while both loans are modelled on 
1-2 incomes, in reality the former typically have 3-4 incomes per household and are therefore 
less likely to default. Consequently there is a need to alter banking models to reflect the true 
dynamic of each household’s income, whilst still maintaining checks on likely long-term 
security given significant indebtedness amongst this group. However, despite evidence that 
approved gap home loans have a low risk of default, approval rates are extremely low (Senior 
banking official1) due to the affordability problems highlighted earlier. This mis-match, 
between private bank expectations and gap household affordablity highlights the erroneous 
assumptions inherent in the state's conceptualisation of gap households as capable of 
functioning like affluent private-property owners, when in fact gap households require 
significant support in order to shift away from state reliance (e.g. education on household 
finances and budgeting that is separate from (failed) banking applications).  
 
Housing Market failures 
In addition to weak household affordability, the other explanation for gap housing policy 
failure is the lack of available stock for those with middle/gap incomes, especially at the 
lower end (CAHF 2015). One solution to this has been the focus on developer-led new-build 
housing projects. However, weak affordability is equally a concern from the developer-
perspective, with developers frequently lamenting their inability to construct a quality house, 
including land purchase and service installation, for a price that would be affordable for those 
at the lower-end of the gap income bracket. This is particularly acute in large cities like Cape 
Town, where land costs are high and consequently there are very few gap units being built 
(Cirolia, forthcoming). 
 
Developers that produce under ZAR300,000 – the structure will be solid, but don’t 
expect carpets, tiles, cupboards – you’re buying a shell [Senior banking official1] 
 
If we took out all the plastering, the kitchen, the flooring, all the quality construction 
and extra bits then we could sell for ZAR230,000 - but then you’re giving someone 
just a shell, that’s not good enough, but that’s what a lot of other developers are doing 
[D.W., private developer] 
 
We find that building a house for ZAR100k is very difficult. So people come to us 
saying we earn ZAR3501 can we get a house, and we say go away, we can’t help you 
… our target market for gap housing is people earning ZAR12,000–18,000 and not 
those earning ZAR3500-7500 because we can’t make that work [W.F., social housing 
institution] 
 
Taking the dual explanation for gap housing failure reveals a context in which not only are 
few new houses developed for gap households, but even when this is achieved, very few gap 
households are able to afford them. Within this environment there have been two responses: 
firstly, the construction of sub-standard houses, and secondly, the provision of housing only 
for those at the upper-end of the gap income range. Confirming the former, frustrations about 
the poor quality of housing construction were a major concern raised by residents in all 
projects where fieldwork was conducted, and largely a consequence of the economic 




The mould is very bad, in some houses there are stalactites dripping off the ceiling … 
everything was done on the cheap [ AM., Royal Maitland site manager] 
 
This is gap housing … our houses have mould, cracks, plumbing problems, electrical 
problems, the light fittings melt … when the wind blows you can feel it and the tiles 
crackle. It’s like being in an informal settlement, but there they don’t have to pay! … 
The only difference between us and living in a shack is that we have a roof and paint 
[M.C., Highlands Village resident] 
 
While gap houses have been criticised for poor quality, especially at the lower-income end, in 
fact the primary response to the impossibility of financing gap housing has been to target 
only at those in the upper-income (i.e. earning more than ZAR8000pcm). This reveals the 
‘real’ bottom of the gap market, meaning that those earning ZAR3501-8000pcm (USD10-
22pd) are excluded from homeownership (CAHF 2015), permanently reliant on renting or 
living with family in a range of formal and informal structures and settlements, in what 
Yiftachel (2009) describes as "permanent temporariness". 
 
80% of the loans we offer within the affordable housing branch are to those earning 
over ZAR8000, and the 20% earning ZAR6000-8000 are where family property is 
being sold cheap [senior banking official1] 
 
We get no support from government. Your margins are tight … You can target the 
upper end of that market, but the lower end, ZAR3500-7500, you can’t service, it’s 
not affordable. In that income bracket, the government is behind reality in terms of 
what things cost [M.M. private developer] 
 
This section has highlighted the limitations of a housing policy that is framed around 
inaccurate assumptions about both demand and supply, ultimately resulting in policy failure. 
By trying to create a tier of private-sector (rather than state-) reliant homeowners, gap 
housing policy has failed to recognise that the needs of gap/middle households and the 
realities of the existing housing and land markets.  
 
 
Caught in the 'middle': policy tension between actors and institutions 
 
Having identified the limitations of housing gap policy, this section considers the experiences 
of those in receipt of gap homeownership (pre-FLISP). An implicit goal of gap housing is to 
support the creation of a home-owning class that is not reliant on the state. This section 
demonstrates how this goal is complicated by the involvement of multiple actors and 
institutions (including the state) each with their own perspective, expectation and agenda. 
Part of this is due to the impossibility of the state creating a housing policy that encourages 
non-state actors to take responsibility for housing financing, provision and allocation, but in a 
context where state involvement is arguably required, not just to incentivise the private 
sector, but also to provide basic welfare support to middle households requiring assistance to 
function in the private market. Consequently, gap housing functions within a hybrid private-
public partnership, which is constantly re-negotiated in practice. Within this context gap 
homeowners function in the 'middle', caught between different actors and institutions, with 
varying expectations and agendas. For gap households this results in significant frustration, 
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confusion, and ultimately a desire for state (or its imagined replacement) involvement that is 
diametrically opposed to the state's intentions. 
 
According to state officials, gap housing is an exclusively private-sector endeavour in which 
the state does not function as the developer or financer (unlike with RDP subsidy housing). 
 
Gap housing is exactly the same as buying a [private sector] house anywhere … the 
control of who gets the houses is with the banks not the city [City housing official1] 
 
The state cannot promise gap housing to people because it’s developer-led [City 
housing official2] 
 
Of course, this is not strictly accurate, because the state often provides access to land for 
reduced costs (and sometimes contributes to basic infrastructure, and with FLISP, provides a 
financial subsidy), but the construction of housing, determination of eligibility and long-term 
responsibility for beneficiaries is exclusively private in the sense that it is undertaken by 
developers and banks rather than the state. However, as a senior housing official remarked, 
this relationship is complex because “who determines availability? Government or banks? 
Who has the burden of responsibility?” (City housing official2). Clearly both public and 
private actors are crucial in the identification of, and delivery of housing to, middle 
households, and although virtually all residents interviewed were aware that both public and 
private actors were involved in their housing allocation and provision, most were unclear 
about how the relationships between these actors functioned, and where the burden of 
responsibility lay. 
 
I saw these houses advertised in the newspaper, so I went to the City council offices 
to put my name down and I had to provide details of where I work and how much I 
earn ... then we had to pay ZAR500 to the lawyers who organised the bond, and I had 
to go to the bank to make arrangements [M.U., Highlands Village resident] 
 
Most gap residents understand that their housing was largely private-sector constructed and 
financed, but that there was some state involvement at the stage of eligibility and allocation 
(though in reality this is largely finance-led). Indeed, as a highly visual reminder, all 
developments analysed in this research hosted billboards with logos from both the public 
municipality and private financers and developers. As a consequence of the multiple actors 
involved many gap residents were unsure who should be held responsible for defects and 
concerns after occupation. And for many gap residents, the housing provider (whether a 
social housing institution or private sector developer) replaces the state in their imaginary in 
terms of long-term responsibility. This clearly conflicts with the state's desire to create a new 
tier of homeowners who are self-reliant and privately-financed. For while the state envisages 
gap housing as a policy to support independent households to enter the existing housing 
market (and to shift them into the 'affluent' demographic category), gap housing recipients 
themselves require additional support as new homeowners who are neither affluent nor poor. 
 
They signed the contract with us, so they know us, so when things go pear-shaped 
they call us … There have been some legitimate queries but also some people phone 
us just with any problems. I think our number must be right by their phone … We 





We have a new gap housing project and the MEC opened it and said “don’t come to 
me if a door handle comes off – fix it yourself [W.F., social housing institution] 
 
The city doesn’t want to be involved with us here. When I spoke to a council man … 
he said we can’t get involved because this is not city housing [M.C., Highlands 
Village resident] 
 
This roots of this tension, between the state's vision of gap households as self-reliant 
homeowners, and households' own perceptions of their homeownership position as highly 
reliant on their service provider, lie in the disjuncture between stakeholders’ perceptions of 
gap housing (and indirectly of gap/middle households), and its positionality in South Africa's 
housing market. Specifically, whether it is primarily a social project aimed at supporting not-
so-poor beneficiaries as a step-up from state-subsidised housing, or an economic programme 
to create a tier of private-financed homeowners who can function independently in the 
property market. While the goal of South Africa’s state-subsidised housing policy has shifted 
from a primarily physical and social objective (to provide long-term shelter for poor 
beneficiaries) towards an overwhelmingly economic agenda (to provide a capital 
accumulating asset for homeowners) in line with the global emphasis on titling as a means for 
asset accumulation (Lemanski, 2011), the goal for gap housing is less clear due to the 
multiple players and lack of clearly demarcated roles. Certainly, city housing and banking 
finance officials view this form of housing strictly in terms of economic criteria and as an 
exclusively private arrangement with minimal state involvement (albeit not entirely accurate); 
but at the same time, those working at the coalface with gap households (e.g. private 
developers and social housing institutions) understand gap in terms of the ‘beneficiaries’ of a 
social and financial housing product who require additional support compared to other 
(higher income) private sector homeowners. 
 
We look at a couple’s income … it’s entirely an economic decision based on the risk 
of the loan for us [Senior banking official1] 
 
Conceptually, gap should be about playing in the financial housing market, not social 
housing provision [City housing official2] 
 
Gap is a private housing project because it’s private money … the beneficiary puts 
down a deposit and the bank gives a bond [City housing official1] 
 
Most gap models just focus on the costs of accommodation … but we also do 
consultation with the community … and financial advice for potential beneficiaries 
[J.W., Private developer] 
 
We have to work hard with gap households … we have to hold their hands at first … 
we organise the bonds on their behalf … then we educate the selected beneficiaries 
[M.M., private developer] 
 
Gap housing is part of our social housing mandate … we do work with banks on our 





                                                            
11 All highlighting by author 
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As is noticeable in the above quotes, a variety of terms are used in reference to the gap 
housing process and recipient households. Use of the term ‘beneficiary’ is surprisingly 
common, implying recipients of (public-private) assistance, rather than independent 
economic agents who have secured private homeownership via bank finance (as the state and 
banks conceive gap housing). Furthermore, gap residents themselves interpret gap housing as 
both a public social good and a private economic good – of course, residents understand that 
economic criteria were used to determine their eligibility for gap support (not just standard 
banking finance), but the very process of eligibility determination leads them to interpret it as 
form of social housing with state involvement, rather than as an entirely private sector 
housing model. This public/private tension further exacerbates the ability of gap housing to 
meet achieve its, largely unrealistic, target of creating non-state reliant homeowners. 
 
As previously identified, the positionality of gap housing within South Africa's existing 
housing market is uncertain. This not only limits the potential for policy success but also 
causes confusion amongst (potential and actual) beneficiaries. One of the roots of this 
problem is in the state's conceptualisation of gap households as a functioning housing sub-
market that can be targeted, when in fact, gap is a negative consequence of policy failure 
(Cirolia, forthcoming). While the government has conceptualised and promoted gap housing 
as the first step in private housing (ie. a private-driven programme to stimulate the housing 
market and create a new tier of independent homeowners); most involved in gap housing 
provision (from developers to recipients) refer to it as the next step-up from government 
subsidy housing (ie. a state-driven programme of housing provision for the not-so-poor). 
While conceptually it is simultaneously both and neither of these options, in practice the 
reliance of gap housing on access to banking finance as the primary determination of 
household eligibility ensures that gap functions as the first step on the private ladder. 
Consequently it is surprising to note how widely it is associated with the RDP subsidy market 
rather than the private sector market. 
 
Gap housing is a stepping stone. People in RDP housing can’t go anywhere, so gap is 
the next step for them. It will lead to activity in the subsidy market … the people in 
the RDP houses will move up if they can afford [City housing official1] 
 
We have gap housing projects … that is housing which is just above RDP status 
[D.W., private developer] 
 
This is like the government housing, but it’s not [F.C., Aliwal Gardens resident] 
 
As the quotes reveal, gap housing is perceived as closer to RDP subsidy housing than to 
private-sector financed housing, and indeed, the gap demographic and purchasing power are 
more closely aligned to subsidy beneficiaries than privately-financed homeowners (Cirolica, 
forthcming). While the difference between conceptualising gap housing as either the next 
step up from RDP subsidy housing or the first rung on the private sector housing ladder may 
seem semantic, the implications in terms of the absence of policy coherence are significant. 
This is particularly acute when considering the lack of upward movement from the RDP 
market to the private property market, suggesting that for many households RDP housing is 
not the first step on the housing ladder, but the only housing step they will ever take 
(Lemanski, 2011). In practice, the state vision of gap housing as representing a new economic 
rung on the private housing market conflicts with gap homeowners’ expectations and needs 




As an example to highlight the ways in which gap households are caught in the policy 
middle, the public/private income/affordability mis-match has resulted in great confusion 
amongst gap households, who perceive themselves as financially eligible for gap housing in 
terms of their income, but who are in fact ineligible after being rejected for banking finance. 
This confusion stems not only from misunderstanding regarding the positionality of gap 
housing between public and private housing, but also households' conceptualisation of 
themselves primarily as potential public (social welfare) beneficiaries rather than private 
consumers. Whilst under the former households’ eligibility is determined by the state largely 
based on income, in the latter eligibility is determined by access to banking finance. So for 
example, there are numerous examples of gap households registering their interest for a 
housing project (and in many cases perceiving that this registration meant they would receive 
a housing unit, much like the subsidy system), but subsequently being refused a unit due to 
inability to secure banking finance, resulting in a perception of corruption based on a 
misunderstanding of the role of the banks (rather than the state or developers) in ultimately 
determining eligibility. Essentially, because the policy is implicitly geared towards a 
conceptualisation of gap households as socially and financially prepared for independent 
homeownership, it fails to recognise their middle status as neither affluent nor poor, 
exclusively reliant on neither public nor private forms of housing and finance, and in need of 





"Individuals living in households which are 'middle of the road' in the national income 
distribution do not possess the socio-economic status typically associated with middle-
class affluence" (Posel and Visagie, 2013:165) 
 
This research has used the example of gap housing policy and practice in South Africa to 
identify and promote the notion of a demographic group of middle households, who function 
outside classic poor/affluent binaries, and whose needs and identity are not represented by 
contemporary middle-class labels. Contemporary debates on defining the middle-class in the 
global South highlight the mis-match between finance-based measures (income and 
consumption) that in Africa include the 'not-so-poor', and everyday understandings of the 
socio-economic status required for middle-class identity. While recognising that the middle-
classes do exist within Africa, this research argues that broadening the definition to include 
the 'not-so-poor' is meaningless given the dominance of normative assumptions about what 
middle-class status requires (e.g. financial independence, social mobility). Instead, and 
responding to the need to focus attention on households who are neither affluent nor poor, 
this research promotes the concept of 'middle' households: caught 'in the middle' of traditional 
policy interventions and practices more suited to either the poor or affluent. By detaching this 
‘middle’ identity from class it becomes possible to shift the goal towards supporting the 
needs of this emerging group, rather than seeking to harness them as the class-based means 
for national transformation. Consequently, the case study of gap housing in South Africa is 
used to highlight the ease with which policy can mis-target the needs of this middling group. 
Similar care studies could be identified elsewhere, for example by focusing on 'key workers' 
in the UK and 'affordable housing' in France, Spain, or the Netherlands. 
 
In South Africa, gap households are those ineligible for state-subsidised housing and unable 
to secure private housing finance, and who therefore exist in the 'gap' between public policy 
and private practices. Various gap housing mechanisms have been promoted to support gap 
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households, with the implicit goal to create a class of private homeowners who are not reliant 
on the state. While the South African state is promoting homeownership for all income-
groups, for example via state-subsidised housing programes for the poor, the approach to gap 
housing is distinct in being explicitly focused on producing private-sector reliant (rather than 
state-supported) homeowners, Consequently the key critique of gap housing policy is at the 
scale of conceptualisation, in that attempts to push middle households towards private sector 
(rather than state) reliance have ignored their middle positionality in assuming that privately-
financed domestic nuclear-family homeownership is achievable via a small amount of 
financial support. In contrast, the research presented here indicates that bank-financed 
homeownership actually requires significant state and market support for gap households that 
not only needs additional financial support, but also non-financial support such as educational 
programmes on for example, budgeting, savings, and credit. Furthermore, the lack of 
consensus regarding the positionality of gap housing policy: as a social or economic measure, 
public or private, a step-up from state-subsidised housing or a step-down from private-sector 
housing; ultimately restricts its potential to succeed in either supporting the needs of gap 
households, or creating the state-desired tier of private-reliant homeowners. 
 
In the global South, the middle are an overlooked category. They exist in the socio-economic 
space between affluence and poverty (rather than within a static income or status boundary), 
caught between public and private initiatives and institutions, and between economic and 
social agendas and policy goals. Ultimately this hybrid middle identity is not a collective 
identity that provides a class consciousness around which those middle households might 
mobilise, but a negative and individualised identity, based on what middle households cannot 
achieve and are not eligible for. Consequently the middle are overlooked, and the 





Absa House Price Indices, 2014, compiled by Jacques du Toit, Johannesburg, 
http://www.absa.co.za/deployedfiles/Absacoza/PDFs/Economic%20Research/Property%20R
esearch/Property%20Commentary/2014/03.%20March/HPI,%2010%20Mar%202014.pdf – 
accessed 30 September 2014 
 
African Development Bank (AfDB). (2011). The Middle of the Pyramid: Dynamics of the 
Middle Class in Africa. Market Brief, 20 Apr.  
 
Amoranto, G., Chun, N. and Deolalikar, A. (2010). Who are the Middle Class and What 
Values do They Hold? Evidence from the World Values Survey, Working Paper Series No. 
229. Manila, Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
 
Atkinson, A.B. and Brandolini, A., 2011, 'On the idenfitication of the 'middle class'', 
ECINEQ working paper, 217. 
 
Ballard R. and Jones, G., 2011, ‘Natural Neighbors: Indigenous Landscapes and Eco-Estates 
in Durban, South Africa’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers 101(1): 131-
148. 
 
Ballard, R., 2012, 'Geographies of development: without the poor', Progress in Human 




Banerjee, A.V. and Duflo, E. (2008). 'What is Middle Class about the Middle Classes around 
the World?', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22( 2): 3-28.  
 
Baumann, T. (2003) Housing Policy and Poverty in South Africa. In F. Khan and P. Thring 
(eds.), Housing Policy and Practice in Post-apartheid South Africa, Heinemnn, South Africa. 
 
Birdsall, N. (2010). The (Indispensable) Middle Class in Developing Countries; or, The Rich 
and the Rest, Not thePoor and the Rest’, Center for Global Development Working Paper No 
207, Washington DC. 
 
Birsdall, N.,2012, A Note on the Middle Class in Latin America, Center for Global 
Development Working Paper No 303, Washington DC. 
 
Burger, R., Steenekamp, C., van der Berg S., Zoch, A., 2004, 'Consumption patterns of South 
Africa's rising black middle-class: Correcting for measurement errors', Paper delivered at the 
Centre for the study of African Economies (CSAE) Conference on Poverty Reduction, Growth 
and Human Development in Africa, Oxford, UK. 
 
Butler, T., 1997, Gentrification and the middle classes, Aldershot: Ashgate 
 
Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa (CAHF). 2015, Understanding the 
Challenges in South Africa’s Gap Housing Market and Opportunities for the RDP Resale 




Clark , T.N. and Lipset, S.M., 1991, 'Are social classes dying?', International Sociology 6(4), 
397-410. 
Corral, P., Molini, P. and Oseni, G., 2015, 'No condition is permanentL middle class in 
Nigeria in the last decade', World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 7214. 
 
Cirolia, L.R., forthcoming, 'Reframing the ‘gap market’: lessons and implications from Cape 
Town’s gap market housing initiative', Journal of Housing and the Built Environment. DOI: 
10.1007/s10901-015-9482-1 
 
CNN, 2011, Are one in three Africans really middle class?, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/BUSINESS/05/20/middle.class.africa/ 
 
De Soto, H. (2000) The Mystery of Capital. Basic Books, New York. 
 
Easterly, W., 2001, 'The middle class consensus and economic development', Journal of 
Economic Growth, 6(4), 317-336. 
 
Fernandes L, 2006 India’s New Middle-class: Democratic Politics in an era of economic 
reform University of Minnesota Press, Minnesota 
 
Gilbert, A.G., 2008, 'Viewpoint: Slums, tenants and home-ownership: on blindness to the 




Gilbert A.G., 2004, Helping the poor through housing subsidies: lessons from Chile, 
Colombia and South Africa. Habitat International 28, 13-40. 
 
Gilbert, D., 1998, The American class structure. New York: Wadsworth Publishing. 
 
Gunter, A. and Manuel, K., 2016, 'In perspective: A role for housing in development: Using 
housing as a catalyst for development in South Africa', Local Economy, 31(1-2): 312-321. 
 
Handley, A., 2014, 'Varieties of capitalists? The middle class, private sector and economic 
outcomes in Africa', WIDER Working Paper 2014/101 
 
Hauser, R.M. and Warren, J.R., 1997, 'Socioeconomic indexes for occupations: a revew, 
update and critique', Sociological Methodology 27(2):177-298. 
 
Hoekstra, J. and Marais, L., forthcoming, 'Can Western European Home Ownership Products 
Bridge the South African housing gap?', Urban Forum, doi:10.1007/s12132-016-9279-7  
 
Hook, D. and Vrdoljak, M., 2002, ‘Gated communities, heterotopia and a “rights” of 
privilege: a heterotopology'of the South African security-park’, Geoforum 33(2): 195–219 
 
Hout, M. , Brooks, C. and Manz, J, 1993, 'The persistence of classes in post-industrial 
societies', International Sociology 8(3), 259-277. 
 
Huchzermeyer, M. (2001) Housing for the poor? Negotiated housing policy in South Africa. 
Habitat International 25, 303-31. 
 
Huchzermeyer, M. (2003) Low income housing and commodified urban segregation in South 
Africa. In C. Haferburg and J. Oßenbrügge (eds.), Ambigious Restructurings of Post-
apartheid Cape Town, Lit Verlag, Hamburg.  
 
James, D., 2014, Money from Nothing: indebtedness and aspiration in South Africa, Stanford 
University Press. 
 
Jeffrey C, 2010 Timepass: Youth, Class and the Politics of Waiting in India, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, CA. 
 
Kapsos, S and Bourmpoula, E., 2013, ‘Employment and economic class in the developing 
world’, ILO Research Paper No 6, International Labour Organisation: Geneva 
 
Kharas, H. and Gertz, G., 2010, The new global middle class: a cross-over from west to east. 
In: Li, C. (ed.) China’s Emerging Middle Class: Beyond Economic Transformation, pp. 32–
51. Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC (2010) 
 
Khunou, G., 2015, 'Editorial: South Africa's emergent middle class', Development Southern 
Africa, 32:1, 1-2 
 
Kihato, C., 2013, Migrant Women of Johannesburg: Everyday Life in an In-Between City, 




Landman, K., 2004, Gated communities in South Africa: The challenge for spatial planning 
and land use management, Town Planning Review 75(2): 151-172 
 
Landman, K., 2006, ‘Privatising public space in post-apartheid South African cities through 
neighbourhood enclosures’, GeoJournal 66(1-2): 133-146 
 
Lange H. and Meier L (Eds.), 2009, The new middle classes: globalizing lifestyles, 
consumerism and environmental concern, Springer: Dordrecht 
 
Leibbrandt, M., Finn, A. and Woolard, I., 2012, Describing and decomposing post-apartheid 
income inequality in South Africa, Development Southern Africa 29(1), pp19-34. 
 
Lees, L., 2014, 'The 'New' middle class, lifestyle and the 'new' gentrified city', in R. Paddison 
and E. McCann (Eds), Cities and social change: encounters with contemporary urbanism, 
Sage: London, pp35-55. 
 
Lemanski, C., 2004, ‘A new apartheid? The spatial implications of fear of crime in Cape 
Town, South Africa’. Environment and Urbanization, 16(2), pp101-112. 
 
Lemanski, C., 2006, ‘Spaces of Exclusivity or Connection: Linkages between a gated 
community and its poorer neighbour in a Cape Town master-plan development’', Urban 
Studies, 43(2), pp397-420. 
 
Lemanski, C., 2008, ‘Houses without Community: problems of community (in)capacity in a 
low-cost housing community in Cape Town, South Africa’, Environment and Urbanization, 
20(2), pp393-410. 
 
Lemanski, C., 2011, ‘Moving up the ladder or stuck at the bottom? Homeownership as a 
solution to poverty in South Africa’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 
35.1, pp57-77. 
 
Lemanski, C., Landman, K. and Durington, M., 2008, ‘Divergent and similar experiences of 
‘gating’ in South Africa: Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town’, Urban Forum, 19(2), 
pp133-158. 
 
Lemanski, C. and Oldfield, S., 2009, ‘The Parallel Claims of Gated Communities and Land 
Invasions in a Southern City: Polarised State Reponses’, Environment and Planning A, 41(3), 
pp634–648. 
 
Lemanski, C. and Tawa Lama-Rewal, S., 2013, 'The “missing middle”: Class and urban 
governance in Delhi’s unauthorized colonies', Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers, 38(1), 91-105. 
 
Lentz, C., 2016, 'African middle classes: lessons from transnational studies and a research 
agenda', in Melber, H. (Ed.), Examining the African Middle Classes, London: Zed Press, in 
press. 
 
Marais, L and Cloete, J., 2015, 'Financed homeownership and the economic downturn in 




McEwan, C., Hughes, A. and Bek, D., 2015, 'Theorising middle class consumption from the 
global South: A study of everyday ethics in South Africa’s Western Cape', Geoforum, in 
press. 
 
Nijman J 2006 Mumbai’s Mysterious Middle-class International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research 30 758-775 
 
Ncumbe, M., 2013, The Making of the Middle Class in Africa, Future Development Blo, 
World Bank, http://blogs.worldbank.org/futuredevelopment/making-middle-class-africa - 
accessed 3 September 2014 
 
Pillay, A. & Naudé, W.A., 2006. Financing low-income housing in South Africa: Borrower 
experiences and perceptions of banks. Habitat International, 30(4), pp.872–885 
 
Posel, D., 2010, Races to consume: revisiting South Africa’s history of race, consumption 
and the struggle for freedom, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 33 (2), pp. 157–175 
 
Ravallion, M., 2010, ‘The Developing World’s Bulging (but Vulnerable) Middle Class', 
World Development, 38(4): 445-454. 
 
Rivero, G., du Toit, C.P., Hennie, L., 2003, 'Tracking the development of the middle class in 
democratic South Africa', Politeia, 22(3), pp6-29. 
 
Ross, F., 2010, Raw Life New Hope, University of Cape Town Press, Cape Town.  
 
Rust, K. (2006) The missing middle: affordable housing in question. Business Day, 7 
February. 
 
Rust, K., 2009, Gap housing: the next property boom: A conference on innovative funding 
and delivery, presentation to International Housing Solutions Annual Affordable Housing 
conference, http://www.housingfinanceafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/IHS-
conference-input_FinMark.pdf - accessed 20 August 2014 
 
Rust, K., 2012a, How will South Africa’s new FLISP subsidy work?, blog post, 
http://www.housingfinanceafrica.org/blog/how-will-south-africas-new-flisp-subsidy-work - 
accessed 20 August 2014 
 
Rust, K., 2012b, Loud, big and strong: What we know about the gap market in South Africa, 
presentation to International Housing Solutions Annual Affordable Housing, 
http://www.plusto.com/uploads/1900/docs/2012Conference/Kecia%20Rust%20-
%20IHS%20Devcon%202012.pdf – accessed 20 August 2014 
 
Seekings, J and Nattrass, N., 2005, Class, Race, and Inequality in South Africa, Yale 
University. 
 
Shimeles, A. and Ncube, M., 2014, 'The making of the middle-class in Africa: Evidence from 




Shisaka, 2011, Housing subsidy assets: exploring the performance of government subsidized 
housing in South Africa: overall analysis, Report prepared for FinMark Trust's Centre for 
Affordable Housing Finance in Africa. 
 
Sisulu, L.N., 2016, Speech by L N Sisulu, Minister of Human Settlements on the occasion of 
the Budget Vote of the Ministry of Human Settlements, National Council of Provinces, 
Parliament, 19 May 2016. 
 
Southall, R., 2004, 'Political change and the black middle class in democratic South Africa', 
Canadian Journal of African Studies, 38(3), pp521-542. 
 
Southall, R., 2014, 'The black middle class and democracy in South Africa', The Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 52(4), pp 647-670. 
 
Spronk, R., 2012, Ambiguous pleasures: sexuality and middleclass self-perceptions in 
Nairobi, Berghahn: New York. 
 
Statistics SA, 2012a, Census 2011, Statistics SA: Pretoria 
 
Statistics SA, 2012b, Census 2011: Provinces at a glance, Statistics SA: Pretoria 
 
Thurlow, J, Resnick1, D. and Dumebi, 2015, 'Matching Concepts With Measurement: Who Belongs 
To Africa’s Middle Class?', Journal Of International Development, 27, pp588-608 
 
Tomlinson, M. (1999) South Africa’s Housing Policy. Lessons from four years of the new 
Housing Subsidy Scheme. Third World Planning Review 21.3, 283-95. 
 
Tomlinson, M. (2005) Title deeds not a magic wand. Business Day, 10 August. 
 
Visagie, J. and Posel, D., 2013. A reconsideration of what and who is middle class in South 
Africa. Development Southern Africa, 30, 2:149-167 
 
Visagie, J., 2013, 'Who are the middle class in South Africa? Does it matter for policy?', Econ 
3x3, http://www.econ3x3.org/article/who-are-middle-class-south-africa-does-it-matter-policy 
 
Visagie, J., 2015, 'Growth of the middle class: Two perspectives that matter for policy ', 
Development Southern Africa 32(1), pp3-24. 
 
Wright Mills, C., 1951, White Collar: The American Middle Classes, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Yiftachel, O., 2009, 'Critical theory and ‘gray space’: mobilisation of the colonised', City, 
13(2–3), 240–256  
 
Zuma, J., 2012, State of the Nation Address by His Excellency Jacob G Zuma, President of 
the Republic of South Africa on the occasion of the Joint Sitting of Parliament, 




Zuma, J., 2013, State of the Nation Address by His Excellency Jacob G Zuma, President of 
the Republic of South Africa on the occasion of the Joint Sitting Of Parliament, 
http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=14960 – accessed 21 August 2014 
